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Abstract 
Sanctions are one of the main policy tools used in order change behaviour of countries 
involved in conflicts, without using armed forces. This paper examines the possibility 
for a targeted country to escape the potential negative effects from sanctions by 
increasing trade with third countries that has not imposed sanctions. The analysis is 
carried out on the specific case of the sanctions against Russia that was imposed by 
several countries and institutions as a reaction to the Russia-Ukraine conflict regarding 
Crimea. The paper analyse the effects of these sanctions by empirically estimate Russian 
exports between the years 2007-2015. The estimations are performed with different 
specifications of a gravity model, where bilateral exports between Russia and the 
importing country is the dependent variable and variations of country specific 
characteristics are used as explanatory variables. The results are threefold, as Russia’s 
(i) overall exports to the rest of the world decrease when targeted with sanctions, (ii) 
exports to sanctioning countries decreased more than the rest of the world and (iii) 
exports to countries similar to the sanctioning countries have not decreased. 
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1. Introduction 
How do war and conflicts affect global well-established economic relations and trade flows? 
Obviously, the relation between parties directly involved in a conflict is not flourishing, but 
the question can also be considered in a broader perspective. With conflicts affecting both the 
people living in the conflicted area as well as third parties, measures are often taken by the 
outside world with the intent of ending the dispute. The most established policy tool for non-
military interventions in conflicts today is imposition of a sanction on the country that is 
considered to be errant. 
 
A sanction is a comprehensive policy tool that targets several different areas, most common 
are travel-bans, asset freezing and embargoes that aim to isolate the targeted country from the 
surrounding world (United Nations Security Council, 2013). As practically no country with 
growth objectives can be self sufficient in the prevailing globalised and integrated economic 
environment, the world can be seen as a network characterised by different degrees of mutual 
dependence between countries. To put this in a trade perspective, there are a number of levels 
to regard beyond the actual traded goods where the mutual dependence applies. Trade 
concerns not only the producer of the good and the buying firm, but there are financial 
institutions, border procedures as well as the involved managers and workers. Sanctions 
targeting several of these levels could thus be imposed to affect the targeted country to such 
extent that it considers it absolutely necessary to solve the conflict. However, if the entire 
outside world does not jointly impose sanctions, there will be opportunities for the targeted 
country to shift its established trade to other countries. Assuming that the targeted country 
succeeds with the trade diversion implies that the new1 trade partners have instead benefited 
from the imposed sanctions, creating an interesting question of why these particular countries 
benefited. In an international trade related view, the perspective of third party countries 
benefiting from imposed sanctions is worth examining further. This is interesting in a general 
aspect, and to analyse it further it can be applied to actual events and sanctions. The current 
situation in the world is such that Russia, a major country and economic force, have recently 
had sanctions imposed on them. Considering Russia’s size and impact on the world economy, 
it is not unlikely that the sanctions could affect other parties as well. The situation on the 
                                                
1 These trade partners are not necessarily completely new per se, but can be considered new in a 
perspective of increased magnitude of trade flow relative to before the sanctions. 
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Russia-Ukraine conflict is such that most of the western countries2 have mutually imposed 
sanctions on Russia whereas the rest of the world has not. There are various expected 
economic effects of sanctions, both for the imposing country itself and more intuitively, for 
the targeted country. The conflict has put the Russian economy in a recession and both 
imports and exports have fallen since (Russell, 2015). Considering this situation and the fact 
that the sanctions have recently been prolonged (Council of the European Union, 2017), it 
could be crucial for Russia to break this negative trend and start to generate economic growth 
again. One alternative would be for Russia to seek alternative export markets so they can 
keep, or at least diminish the decrease in domestic production. As an example, the EU 
pursued this strategy immediately as the sanctions were imposed in order to compensate for 
the loss of exports to Russia, successfully keeping the export losses from the sanctions at only 
0.3% and 0.4% in 2014 and 2015 (Szczepański, 2015).  
 
On these prerequisites, this paper will examine the effects the sanctions have on trade flows, 
by aiming attention to the specific case of the Russian sanctions. The effects will be estimated 
both in an elementary view that investigates the direct consequences for Russia but also, in 
line with the discussion above, through a more sophisticated analysis regarding how diverting 
trade to other export markets could affect the overall impact of being targeted with sanctions. 
The questions of research will therefor be stated as: 
 
i) Has Russia’s bilateral exports been affected by the sanctions following the 
Ukraine conflict? 
ii) Can a country that is being targeted with sanctions decrease potential negative 
trade effects through trade with third countries? 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a thorough briefing of the 
state and objectives of sanctions as well as an outline over the events behind the imposed 
sanctions. Section 3 encounters for the previous research that has been conducted in the field, 
while section 4 will offer the theoretical foundation to economic theories as well as sanction- 
and trade specific theories. Section 5 describes the methods used to carry out the estimation of 
this paper and section 6 then gives an account for the results of the estimations along with 
several robustness tests. Section 7 will summarize and conclude the paper. 
                                                
2 A list of countries that has imposed sanctions can be found in the appendix 
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2. Background 
This section will start off by explaining the concept of sanctions, the different varieties of 
sanctions and how they can be used as well as what they can consist of. A historical 
perspective is also put on the subject with the intension of giving a picture of how, and in 
which situations, sanctions have been used up until today. This is followed by a review of the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict that aims to clear any uncertainties regarding the prevailing situation 
and the potential motives that each actor may have for taking measures against another as 
well as motives for not taking measures. 
2.1. Sanctions 
2.1.1.	The	Structure	of	a	Sanction	
A sanction is a measure to maintain or restore international peace and security without the use 
of armed forces (United Nations, 2015). In order to get a picture of how sanctions can be 
imposed and how a targeted country is affected, a horizontal and a vertical approach can be 
applied. The horizontal view regards the state of which the sanctions are imposed, where the 
vertical aspect regards what the imposed sanction consists of. Beginning with the horizontal 
point of view, sanctions can be either unilateral or multilateral. A unilateral sanction is a 
sanction imposed by a single country, where no other countries are behind the sanctions or 
joining them. As an example of how thus could appear, the United States imposed unilateral 
sanctions against Cuba, Iran and North Korea because these countries have adhered to 
policies that, according to the US, threaten US security interests (Kern, 2009).  
 
A multilateral sanction is then, naturally, a sanction imposed by more than one country. It 
should be noted that it is not only countries that use this policy tool, organisations and 
institutions like the UN and EU can also impose sanctions. When they do the measures have 
to be applied by all member countries and thus, sanctions imposed by organisations are also 
considered multilateral. Many research papers have tried to determine which type of sanction 
is most effective (see Drezner, 2000, Bapat and Morgan, 2009 and Kim, 2013 among others), 
but the results are consistently inconclusive and as different studies have come to different 
answers there is no common agreement on one type of sanction that is considered to be 
superior. Intuitively, multilateral sanctions could be argued to have a larger effect that a 
unilateral, since it imposed by more countries and therefor is cutting off more of the targeted 
countries connection to the surrounding world, but this is not always the case. As a unilateral 
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sanction can cover exactly the areas the imposing country likes, a multilateral sanction could 
have problems reaching an as comprehensive solution since the wills of all included countries 
would need to be regarded (Bapat and Morgan, 2009). This could be linked back to the 
discussion on the inconclusive characteristic of the research, providing some understanding to 
the ambiguous conclusions on whether unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more effective.  
 
In a historical perspective, unilateral sanctions were used more frequently during the major 
part of the 20th century, while the absence of multilateral sanctions increased with time, much 
due to the emergence of such organisations as the UN, EU and WTO. The first sanction 
implemented by the UN was in 1963 and was targeted against the apartheid regime in South 
Africa. Since then, the popularity of the policy tool has not cooled down and in 2013 the UN 
had 13 sanctions in force (United Nations Security Council, 2013). The EU has specified 
some examples of what their measures consists of when imposing a sanction. First of all, for a 
sanction to be imposed, a decision must be taken regarding the proposed sanction at the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Council, where a unanimous voting gives the 
full legal effect to the sanction. Frequent measures that are often included are (Council of the 
European Union, 2014b): 
- Arms embargo 
- Asset Freeze 
- Visa or travel ban 
2.1.2	Purpose	of	Sanctions	
First of all, sanctions are not intended to be considered as a purposeless punishment on an 
errant country, but rather as a measure to bring a change to the targeted country (Council of 
the European Union, 2014b). The distinction lies in the aim to provoke a long-term change in 
behaviour instead of just penalising the targeted country for the sake of it. An imposed 
sanction is then revised continuously where a decision to either lift the sanction or to prolong 
it is taken. On the 13th of March, EU’s prevailing sanctions against Russia was prolonged six 
months in a review that also altered the composition of the sanction by removing two persons 
from the list of restricted persons and entities (Council of the European Union, 2017). 
 
Continuing with a basic, but yet essential question: why are sanctions imposed? First, in the 
globalised and internationally connected world of today, a state of mutual dependency among 
countries has emerged. The reason for this is naturally because it is beneficial to do so, 
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countries are better of importing a good in which it does not have a comparative advantage to 
relative to another country than producing the good itself. Instead it is better to produce more 
of the good in which you do have a comparative advantage and export the surplus. This leads 
to a situation where both countries are better off when trading the abundant commodities with 
each other than what they would be in the autarky situation. If, hypothetically, the whole 
world would impose a comprehensive sanction on one single country, this would generate a 
situation where the whole outside world lives in the integrated state whereas the targeted 
country would appear in a suboptimal autarky situation of which it would not want to be. 
Thus, if the targeted country suffered enough losses it would need to change its original 
behaviour that generated the sanction such that the sanctions are lifted and the objective has 
been achieved. A more thorough approach will be also provided in the Theoretical 
Framework section of this paper 
 
2.2. The Russian Sanctions  
Finding Russia and Ukraine a couple of years into the conflict, the situation is as of the 
publication of this paper still complicated and there is yet no unity on the belongings of 
Crimea. As an example of the ambiguity today, in one end of the spectre the Russian Prime 
Minister in June 2105 said that Crimea had fully been integrated to the Russian Federation 
(International Business Times, 2015) and the other side the United Nations does not recognize 
this and still maps Crimea as a part of Ukraine territory. The dissonance can be argued to stem 
from the countries’ relation reaching decades back, but the explicit schism is traced back to 
2014. 
 
The beginning of 2014 was a turbulent period in Ukraine building up to a revolt in Kiev, 
ousting president Viktor Yanukovich on February 22. The turn of events escalated rather 
quickly and the situation reached a peak of volatility on February 26, when pro-Russian and 
pro-Ukraine demonstrators clashing outside the parliament building in Crimea during a 
parliament meeting. The reason for the demonstrations stems from a referendum on Crimea’s 
sovereignty that was to be held the same night, but the referendum was cancelled due to the 
events outside the building. However, this did not slow down the pace of events because the 
following morning, armed men seized the building and journalists were banned and 
lawmakers had their phones confiscated at the doors (Reuters, 2014). According to the 
parliaments webpage, a voting was held and a majority had voted for sovereignty of Crimea. 
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The legitimacy of the voting has been questioned, with voices being raised witnessing both 
fake and duplicated votes, in order to steer the result in the desired direction. The process to 
have Crimea joining the Russian Federation immediately followed and at March 16 a new 
voting was held, a voting in which great majority was in favour of joining Russia. On the 
other end, the Russian Parliament held another voting adopting a legislation making the 
annexation of Crimea easier. 
 
The United States and other western countries were early very clear with its opinion on the 
events and actions being played out by Russia. The United States’ President Barack Obama 
"emphasised that Russia's actions were in violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and that, in co-ordination with our European partners, we are prepared to impose 
additional costs on Russia for its actions" (The Guardian, 2014a). Many other leaders used 
similar rhetoric and the quickly imposed sanctions did therefor not come as a surprise.  
 
To provide an overview of the imposed sanctions against Russia, the following world map 
shows which countries have introduced a sanction imposed and which have not, where the 
green countries are the ones that have imposed sanctions on the blue coloured Russia.3 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 For a full list of countries with sanctions against Russia, see appendix. 
 10 
The sanctions included all the standard measures of asset freezes, travel bans and arms 
embargo along with a restriction of access to Russia’s economic and financial markets. The 
restriction states that for the EU, nationals and companies cannot use financial instruments 
issued by Russian banks or use services related to such instruments (Council of the European 
Union, 2014c). Besides just disabling for the direct possibility to act on the Russian financial 
market, it also limits EU nationals’ and companies’ presence on the Russian goods market as 
both trading and acting on the Russian market requires interaction on the financial market. 
The financial restriction is thus both affecting the direct trade in goods and the trade with 
intermediate goods used for production in Russia, aggravating the possibility to produce and 
ultimately export goods abroad. It is also worth mentioning that the sanctions did not go un-
responded from Russia and in August 2014 they decided to imposed counter-sanctions and 
restricted imports on food and agricultural products from the US, the European Union, 
Australia, Canada and Norway (The Guardian, 2014b). The analysis in the paper regards 
export and export markets and the counter sanctions will thus not directly affect the 
estimations, however it is worth mentioning as a further remark on the status of the relations 
between the parties.  
3. Previous Research 
Since the late 20th century there has been a significant increase in the interest for studying the 
impact of economic sanctions from different perspectives. However, despite the rather 
comprehensive research on the general field of economic sanctions, it is worth mentioning 
that studies on trade effects from economic sanctions is not as widely covered. With this said, 
literature on the subject do exist and from a perspective of the subjects of this paper, the 
research and articles can be divided in two levels. One section of research in the general field 
of trade effects of economic sanctions and one, considerably slimmer, subsection that covers 
the specific subject of the recent economic sanctions against Russia. Considering the relative 
scarcity of studies on specific trade effects from sanctions, along with the topicality of the 
Russia sanctions, this paper will contribute to the research in the field by studying trade 
effects of the sanctions on Russia, which up until the publication of this paper has not been 
done before. 
 
Hufbauer, Elliott, Cyrus and Winston (1997) wrote one of the trademark articles on trade 
effects from economic sanctions, where the authors investigated what impact US sanctions 
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had on bilateral trade flows. Their findings showed that not only did the trade in the 
sanctioned sectors reduce, but also trade in sectors that were not directly targeted by sanctions 
were negatively affected. This implies that the effects on bilateral trade flows go beyond just 
the prevailing sanctions, twisting the trade pattern for the sanctioned country in a larger scale. 
Hufbauer et al. (1997) also notes that countries that are similar to the sanctioning country but 
do not have a sanction imposed shows a positive effect on trade flows with the sanctioned 
country, which is interesting since it touches briefly on the viewpoint and purpose of this 
paper. Despite the intuitive effect of positive trade flows for outside countries, there are also 
effects on countries that are not directly targeted but geographically located beside the 
targeted country. Slavov (2007) finds that neighbours to counties targeted with sanctions by 
The United Nation (UN) have decreased trade flows during the period of the sanctions. This is 
argued to be an effect of increased transportation costs and trade disruptions by for example 
cut of trading routes. Slavov calls these neighbouring countries “innocent bystanders” that are 
just at the wrong place at the wrong time. In contrast to Hufbauer et al. (2007) this shows that 
there are several effects to consider when analysing changing trade patterns as a cause of 
imposed sanctions. 
 
On the findings from Hufbauer et al. of positive trade flows for countries that are similar to 
the imposing country, Yang, Askari, Forrer and Zhu (2009) investigate the effect on EU’s 
trade flows with countries targeted by sanctions imposed by the United States. Their results 
show that in the short run, EU’s trade flows with the targeted country are negatively affected 
by the US sanctions. This is argued to be a consequence of the immediate depressing effect on 
the sanctioned country and its overall economic activities. However, in the long run they find 
a positive effect on trade flows with EU and thus, the trade flow pattern has shifted to gain the 
non-sanctioning countries. The authors call this transfer of trade flows a “third-country effect” 
and conclude that these effects can also be sanction-busting, implying that the targeted 
country is not harmed as much as intended by the imposing country.  
 
These articles are important to understand the effects and impacts of economic sanctions in a 
general perspective, but they do not say anything about the prevailing situation with the 
sanctions against Russia. Despite this situation being rather recent, Hinz and Crozet (2016) 
approaches the issue and investigates how the sanctions against Russia have affected the 
direct trade between Russia and EU. The authors divide the paper in two sections where the 
first part analyse trade flows and the second analyse prices of traded goods, both estimations 
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are carried out with a gravity model. The included products are also disaggregated and 
divided into “Embargoed” and “Non-Embargoed” products to enable analyses in differences 
between products that are included in the sanctions and those that are not. The results shows 
that the bilateral trade flows for all traded products have declined from the second wave of the 
sanctions, the same holds for trade in embargoed products. However, trade flows of non-
embargoed products have decrease already from the first wave of sanctions. It is argued that 
the non-embargoed products account for 83.1% of the lost trade, something that the authors 
refer to as collateral damage. This collateral damage is suggested to be a consequence of the 
financial sanctions on Russia, hampering trade finance services needed to operate in the 
Russian market.  
 
Furthermore, the authors apply a view of discussion on the costs related to imposing 
sanctions, contrary to the more common angle of estimating the damage from being the target 
of a sanction. The authors find that the countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia as a 
consequence of the Ukraine conflict has, from the imposition in 2014 until the end of 2015, 
lost US$ 44 billion. Shedding light upon the fact that sanctions do not only affect the targeted 
country in a negative way, their results are implying that there are incentives for countries to 
carefully investigate whether or not they should impose a sanction. 
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
As previously mentioned, sanctions as a policy tool relies on the conception that countries 
benefit from trading with each other rather than living in an autarky situation producing 
everything it consumes itself. This section contains the framework to explain why sanctions 
are imposed in a theoretical approach. 
 
First, in order to provide a simple picture of how countries are affected by not being able to 
trade, Figure 1 provides a straightforward supply and demand diagram with two scenarios. 
One that implies that the target would find itself in complete autarky situation and another 
where it trades freely with the rest of the world. The situation is viewed from the domestic 
market of the targeted country. The figure will be supporting in understanding the fundament 
of the analysis regarding how the target’s exports is affected if it does not find alternate export 
markets. The diagram presents a case were the targeted county is a natural exporter of a good, 
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perfect competition is assumed such that the autarky equilibrium is at the price p and quantity 
q and the world price is at p’. 
 
Figure 1. Excess Supply 
 
Starting with the case of free trade and no sanctions, the targeted country is producing a total 
of q’. As this output level is higher than the domestic demand, there is an excess supply that 
the country is then exporting to the rest of the world. This export level is depicted in the 
export market diagram where all of the domestic excess supply is sold on the world market at 
the price p’. When considering the autarky case where the country has sanctions imposed, the 
new price level would be the autarky price p. At this price level, the supply and demand is 
equal at output q. Looking at the export market diagram, the price p does not generate any 
excess supply and hence there would have been zero exports at this price level even without 
the sanctions. The effects of the sanctions can be seen as domestic output has decreased by q’- 
q, which naturally hurts the targeted country. As discussed earlier, the intention from the 
imposing country is that the magnitudes of the negative effects are large enough for the 
targeted country to change its behaviour so that the sanctions are lifted. 
 
Moving on to a more advanced model of how the sanctions affect the target’s economy, 
consider a hypothetical case where there are no trade at all with the countries that imposed 
sanctions. Also this time there are two scenarios, one before the sanctions are imposed and 
one when there are sanctions imposed. The effects of going from free trade to the sanction-
scenario is visualised in the diagram in Figure 2, where the situation is viewed from the 
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market of the countries that are imposing sanctions, the ones that are no and the targeted 
country respectively. This figure will show how the target’s exports are affected as well as 
how the third countries can be benefiting. The diagram presents a case were the targeted 
county is an exporter of a good, the equilibrium before the sanctions implies that there is a 
world price p and the targeted country exports a total of X to both Senders and Neutral. 
 
Figure 2. Export effects of sanctions 
 
Starting again with the case of free trade and no sanctions, the targeted country is producing a 
total of X. As no country has yet imposed sanctions, the import demand that the target faces is 
the aggregated import demand to the whole world. This export supply and aggregated import 
demand generates the equilibrium level with X exports at the price p. Moving on to the case 
where Senders impose sanctions on the target, this implies that their import demand shift from 
µSender to µ’Sender which is equal to zero. The aggregate import demand curve shifts to MD’, 
generating a new equilibrium where the target’s export level is decreased to X’ and the new 
price is p’. The neutral countries now demands µ’ at this new price, which is an increase from 
their previous µ imports. From this, it is easy to see that there are countries that could benefit 
from not being involved in sanctions that are imposed. 
 
As the previous section discussed the effects from sanctions from the export perspective of 
the targeted country, it is also possible to look at the situation from the eyes of the sender 
countries. This time, it is not assumed that the sanctions completely shut of trade, but instead 
the sanctions are assumed to generate higher costs of trade compared to the countries without 
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sanctions on them. Note that the cost of trade should not be confused with the price of he 
products exported, as in the above figure. The diagram, which has its origin from a reversed 
type of preferential trade theory, is depicted in Figure 3. The increased costs of trading with 
the sanctioned country is visualised by the difference in T for the sanctioned country and the 
Rest of the World. T thus represents the trading costs for the importing country. In the normal 
state with no sanctions, the exporting countries have the same prerequisites as they can export 
goods at P’-T, generating XT’ = XR’ exports.  
 
Figure 3. Export effect 
 
Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz (2012) 
 
When a sanction is imposed, the targeted country instead has higher trading costs, shifting the 
MS curve to MSSanctioning which implies that the border price decrease to P”-T while the rest of 
the world still faces the border price P’-T. The consequence of this is can easily be identified 
as the targeted country’s exports fall to XT*. This decrease in exports is directly related to the 
first question of research in this paper, as this theory suggests a decrease in Russian exports 
from having sanctions imposed. 
 
There are also theoretical models on a deeper level that can be used to explain the effects of 
trade and in this specific case, the effects of not being able to trade. In addition to the overall 
approach above, the New Trade Theory considers a more detailed view on trade, 
acknowledging the emergence of trade in intermediate goods in addition to the trade in final 
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goods. With the connected and globalised world today, a final good is rarely assembled 
completely from products origin from the same country. Building on the Hecksher-Ohlin 
theory, input goods that are used in a final good can be traded from the country with a 
comparative advantage in producing that specific good. Thus, it is not hard to visualise the 
large trading networks created for the production of advanced products, generating potential 
chain effects through the imposition of a sanction from both perspective of the imposing and 
targeted country. 
 
The aspects discussed in this section describe theoretically why a sanction-targeted country’s 
economy is affected by the on-going sanctions imposed on them and also why certain third 
part countries might benefit from them. The theories also emphasize the importance of finding 
new export markets in order not to be too severely hurt by the sanctions. It is also worth 
stressing the fact that shifting trade and export relations should not be considered a simple and 
straightforward matter, but rather as a potentially complex procedure as old business relations 
will be ended and new ones have to be established. 
5. Method 
The objective of this study is to estimate how sanctions affect previously established trade 
flows and the possibility of creating new ones. It does so by empirically analysing the on-
going sanctions against Russia with data on the bilateral trade flows of goods exported from 
Russia to the rest of the world. In this way it is possible to identify if shifts in the trade pattern 
in the world has emerged and if so, in which direction. With the essential basics and 
foundations of the paper accounted for, this section will act as a bridge from the theoretical 
part into understanding the construction and purpose of the fundamental estimations that are 
carried out. It is done by providing both an insight to the datasets being used, as well as 
through a thorough review of the empirical model used. The specific model is described in 
detail and a discussion on advantages and potential drawbacks are included to render a 
transparent and clear picture of the performed estimations. 
5.1. Empirical Model 
When analysing trade flows and the different determinants of trade, the gravity model has 
been the most commonly used method for a long period. The fundamental idea of the model 
lays in a conception that bilateral trade flows are larger the higher economic mass there is 
between the countries, also considering other factors like distance between countries and 
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population. A more detailed explanation of the variables included in the analysis will be 
provided later in this section. There are various ways of estimating the gravity model, where 
new alterations and improvements have emerged regularly during the last centuries. Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) presented what is widely considered as a benchmark paper on how 
to estimate trade flows with the gravity model.  
5.1.1.	Export	Similarity	Index	(ESI)	
The analysis on trade diversion and the potential shifts in trade flow in this paper is 
fundamental, considering the objective to examine these very effects of sanction. To be able 
to find these effects, it is necessary to identify the countries that are likely to be “new” 
alternate export markets. Previous studies on this kind of topic suggests a method of finding 
the similarity between countries are in terms of trade characteristics by assessing how much 
their trade overlap each other. In this way it is possible to identify possible substituting 
markets by estimating the similarity between the countries that have imposed sanctions and 
the ones that have not. Using a measure called Export Similarity Index (ESI) identifies these 
potential benefiters from the sanctions. The index was put forward by Finger and Kreinin 
(1979) and is still considered the benchmark method for investigating similarity in traded 
products between countries. To implement the analysis on potential trade effects, the usual 
gravity model variables are complemented by different variables that address the sanctions on 
Russia in various ways. There are two straightforward variables on Russia’s overall trade 
effects post sanctions as well as on the countries that have imposed sanctions. A third variable 
covers potential benefiters of trade flow as they have a similar trade pattern as the countries 
that have imposed sanctions. This is calculated with the ESI as mentioned in the theoretical 
section of the paper. ESI, which is also called the Finger-Kreinin Index, was put forward by 
Finger and Kreinin (1979) as a formula to measure the similarity in products exported or 
imported between two countries to a third market. More specifically, the idea behind it is to 
capture the similarity in the fraction of traded product categories and the model is defined as 
 
 𝐸𝑆𝐼(𝑖𝑗, 𝑘) =  𝑀𝑖𝑛. !!"#!!" , !!"#!!"!   (1) 
 
Here, ESI is measuring the export similarity between country i and country j in their trade 
with country k. The products traded are divided in product sectors each with the notation c. 
Thus, !!"#!!"  represents the share of trade in sector c between i and j relative to total trade 
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between the countries. To provide an intuitive explanation to the measure, if two countries 
have identical trade pattern to the third country the index will take the value of 1 and if totally 
dissimilar it will take the value 0. This formula will enable for calculations and credible 
approximations of which countries will have potential benefiting from the Russian sanctions 
in terms of increased trade flows. The variable and its interpretation will be discussed more 
thoroughly along with the other included variables below. 
 
5.1.2.	The	Gravity	Model	
When it comes to the estimation of the gravity model, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
originally used a least squares method to estimate their model, something that later been 
debated not to be optimal for several reasons. First, the common problem with zero trade 
flows is generating problems with such a model due to the logarithmic nature. In this case, 
this is not an essential feature as the zero-trade flows are not included in the sample due to a 
complication of identifying missing values of reported trade flows and separating them from 
actual zero-trade flows4. Second and more importantly for the estimations carried out in this 
paper, trade data is commonly suffering from heteroscedasticity, implying that the error term 
increases with the size of the trade flows which biases and makes the effects inconsistent 
when estimated in a log-linear form (Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro and Larch, 2016). These 
issues can be solved by estimating the gravity model with a Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) estimator (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) which is considered the most 
accurate estimator. The PPML will thus be the estimator of choice for the model used in this 
paper and in its most basic version it takes the form of Equation (2). 
 
 
(2) 
 
The above model is thus a standard PPML gravity model and it will be estimated with 
importer-exporter fixed effect panel data to address possible endogeneity issues. This will 
control for the unobservable characteristics that do not vary over time and country-pairs such 
that the included variables capture as much as possible of what they are intended to (Yotov et. 
al, 2016). The main explanatory variable is conflict, which sis a dummy variable that takes the 
                                                
4 It should be noted that doing this can affect the estimations as the actual zero-trade flows are not 
included in the sample 
Xijt = αi  + β1ln(GDPit) + β2ln(GDPjt) + β3conflictjt + δc + λij + γt + εcijt  
 
 19 
value 1 for the time period during the Russia-Ukraine conflict and 0 if the time period is not 
during the conflict. Regarding the indexes in the model, i denote the observation’s importing 
country, j the exporter, t is the year and c represents the product sector traded. γt and λij 
represents the time- and country-pair fixed effects while Xijt is the dependent variable and 
denotes the bilateral import to country i from country j at the year t. δc is a variable that 
controls for differences between product classes, using disaggregated data and controlling for 
varieties in traded products will decrease the possibility of receiving biased effects due to 
sector-specific trade characteristics. It should be noted that many of the usual gravity model 
variables are controlled for without being included in the variable list, due to the fact that 
Russia is the only exporting country and therefor are constant. This includes variables such as 
contiguity, colonial history and common language to some of the more important ones. The 
gravity model takes the form of Equation (2), it is however not the only model, but rather the 
basic form of more advanced models that will be used in the estimations. Hence, as this paper 
aims to carry out an advanced and multi-faced analysis, Equation (2) merely acts as the basic 
model which examines how Russian exports are affected by the sanctions while more 
sophisticated models are then built to examine if and how Russia’s trade flow might have 
shifted. The full and final model is Equation (3). 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
The main explanatory variables will be the sanction dummy-variable Sender and the variable 
Benefiter. Sender has the value 1 if the importing country has imposed a sanction on Russia as 
a consequence of the Ukraine-conflict. To emphasize previous discussion, these sanctions are 
not explicitly applied to trade on regular goods, but due to financial sanctions and asset 
freezing in Russia, a zero-effect is not necessarily expected for this variable. Benefiter 
represents the countries’ highest Export Similarity Index for any of the countries that have 
imposed sanctions on Russia, during the years the on-going sanctions. Considering the regular 
gravity model variables, the countries’ respective size is controlled for with the GDP 
variables on each observation. ln GDPit contains information on the importer’s GDP at time t, 
while ln GDPjt contains information on the exporter’s GDP at time t. Both GDPs are in log 
values. Since Russia is the only exporter in this model, this variable will naturally on 
represent the GDP of Russia. The GDP variable also has another important advantage, as it 
Xijt = αi + β1ln(GDPit) + β2ln(GDPjt) + β3Benefiterjt + β4Senderjt + δc +γt + λij + εcijt  
 
 20 
controls for the present Russian recession and decreases the risk of an endogeneity problem in 
the estimation. This implies that this variable captures the effects from a general decline in the 
Russian economy, so that this effect is not accidently found in the main variables sender, 
benefiter and conflict. Furthermore, the European Parliament reported that trade flow effects 
in different product sectors varies considerably between the EU countries (Szczepański, 
2015). In order to control for such differences in trade flows due to differences in products 
traded, the variable δc is included and captures all differences in sector specific trade5. This is 
a useful control variable since it increase the probability of assessing more accurate changes 
in the trade flows due to the sanctions instead of changes in trade flows due to changes in for 
example decreased demand in a certain product sector irrespective of the sanctions.  
 
At last, the robustness tests and the estimations methods used to perform these will consist of 
additional variables in order to investigate the credibility of the main results. These variables 
and estimation methods are described in that specific section and will hence not be further 
discussed here. As the main model is estimated with fixed effects Poisson Maximum 
Likelihood, commonly included bilateral variables of the gravity model that are constant over 
time is automatically accounted for. Once again, since Russia is the only exporter in the 
model, some country-pair specific characteristics are also constant over time. For these 
reasons, variables such as distance, colonial history, and common language are controlled for 
in the model but not written out in the equations. 
 
5.2. Data 
There are three different types of data that are being used in this gravity model. The primary 
source of information when conducting the model is naturally the bilateral trade data, which is 
collected from the UN Comtrade (2017) database. In order to generate an as sophisticated 
model as possible, the trade data is disaggregated by the Harmonized System (HS) 
classification on a 2-digit level, implying that exports and imports are classified through a 
total of 99 product categories. This enables for creation of the previously discussed control 
variables by dividing the traded goods into different product sectors according to regular 
standards (Foreign Trade Online, 2017). The original 99 product classes are thus being 
distributed into the 15 product sectors used to control for potential differences in trade flows 
between products in the model. The time period of the sample stretch from 2007-2016, where 
                                                
5 More information on how this variable is constructed is found in 5.2. Data 
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the most recent data available is used in order to achieve an as contemporary and up-to-date 
analysis as possible. As mentioned previously, the dataset does not contain any zero-trade 
observation, which both has advantages and caveats. The advantage is that there will be no 
doubt to whether observations with zero trade is a missing, non-reported observation or if 
there actually were no trade present. The downside is that not all true observations will be 
included in the sample, which can affect the estimations. However, as the benefits of using 
only positive, non-zero trade flows overweigh, this is how the dataset is constructed.  
 
The second type of data used in the model is the country-specific data. This is the data that is 
most characteristic specifically for estimations with gravity model as it contains information 
on the countries that are trading with each other. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a 
country acts as a proxy for a country’s size and this data is collected from the World 
Development Index (The World Bank, 2017). Furthermore, country-pair data such as 
distances between countries are collected from the CEPII Institute (CEPII, 2017). At last, the 
third type of data used in the estimations is the country specific sanction data that specifies 
whether or not a country has imposed a sanction on Russia. Also included is information on 
the nature of countries’ attitude towards the prevailing sanctions. The data on imposed 
sanctions are collected from the EU and UN and the ESI are in 2014 numbers (Azubuike, 
Mendez-Parra and Rollo, 2014). The robustness section investigates how the definitions of the 
different variables are affecting the result, where also information on countries’ attitude 
towards the Russian sanctions are incorporated. This information on attitudes is collected 
from reporting media and newspapers (Russia Direct & Gazeta.ru, 2014). Finally, the 
different type of dataset are merged and analysed, not only in main the model described 
above, but also in a number of robustness tests and extended estimations for reasons that will 
be discussed in the Empirical Results section. 
 
5.2.1.	Descriptive	Statistics	of	Data	Sample	
This section aims to provide both an understanding of which type of data is included in the 
dataset as well as offering an easy interpreted overview. Furthermore, the sections can act as a 
fundament to the credibility and topicality of this paper by establishing, or at least arguing for 
the legitimacy of the dataset. 
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Figure 2 sums Russia’s exports during the time period of the data sample. The figure displays 
absolute exports for both the countries imposing sanctions (senders) and the countries similar 
to Russia (benefiters). The aspect of interest is the change in exports over the years and for 
pedagogical reasons the absolute values are not published. Instead, the figure intends to 
provide an overview of the relative changes in exports over time and despite the relatively 
short time span, it is still possible to observe both recent macroeconomic events that occurred 
as well as differences between the two groups of countries. The financial crises in late 2008 
has clearly affected exports in the following years and, of course, the effects from the 
instability in Russia as a result of the Ukraine conflict in 2014 marked by the dashed line. In 
addition to providing an overview of the activity over the last years, Figure 2 can also be used 
as an argument for the reliability of the dataset.  
 
Figure 4. Russian Exports to the Rest of the World 
 
 
Changing perspective from the previous figure, where the exports from a Russian view were 
depicted, it can also be mentioned who are the big Russian trade partners in the sample. In 
line with the fundamental theories of the gravity model, Russia’s biggest export markets are 
also their closest export markets as Europe and Asia contributes to about 90% of total trade. 
America is the third biggest export market, which despite the distance accounts for 
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approximately 8% of total exports, something that in a gravity model context can be 
explained by the relatively large economic size of the continent. 
 
To provide a picture of what type of goods Russia exports, Figure 4 contains Russia’s total 
exports disaggregated on product sector level during the time period of the sample. To little 
surprise, the product sector “Mineral Products” containing petroleum oil and gas is by far 
Russia’s largest export sector. Chemicals and metals constitute the second and third largest 
export sector. In the other end of the spectra, leathers, furs, hats and footwear are the sectors 
with the least exports. This can undoubtedly be argued to conform to the previously discussed 
economic theories on comparative advantage and abundance, yet again stressing the justice of 
the data as a good foundation for analyses. The large part of exports in mineral products also 
signals that awareness needs to be raised when performing the estimations, since this implies 
that the trade in these products might dominate the results. However, even though one 
precautionary measure is taken by including the product sector control variable, robustness 
tests will be carried out with mineral products excluded from the sample. 
 
Figure 5. Disaggregated Export 
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Bearing in mind that conclusions should not be drawn from descriptive statistics, it is still 
useful as an indicator and a good feature to explain the dataset. However useful it may be as 
an overview, more important arguments have been emphasized in this section. With a dataset 
that is shown to be consensual with both present and prevailing economic climate and events, 
the data also appears credible as the foundation for the empirical estimations. If the dataset 
had not been in line with the economic events and theories, there would have been reason to 
question the estimations carried out from it. 
6. Empirical Results 
This section is the foundation for the analyses and estimations carried out to examine the 
questions regarding trade flow effects that stems from the sanctions against Russia. First, to 
emphasize the objective of the paper, the main purposes of the estimations will be reviewed 
and discussed along with an explanation of applied models and variables. Secondly, the 
empirical results will be thoroughly examined and analysed accompanied by interpretations of 
the results. At last, several robustness tests will be carried out as well as a discussion on 
potential caveats of the estimations. Even though the intention is to generate a model and 
results that is as accurate as possible, transparency is of great importance and a discussion on 
possible shortcomings contributes to the overall understanding of the estimation results. 
 
6.1. Estimations 
As previously discussed, the estimations of this paper have the intention of examining how 
the sanctions against Russia have affected its exports. Explicitly, this is achieved by analysing 
Russian exports to the rest of the world by looking at several key characteristics. The basic 
model used to perform the estimations is Equation (2) but in order to build up the analysis, 
estimations on various alterations of this model are also carried out. The dependent variable 
will always be bilateral exports from Russia to the destination country; in this way the 
interpretation of the explanatory variables is simply an effect that each specific variable has 
on Russian exports. However, the specific interpretation for each variable varies depending on 
the nature of it, and will be discussed individually along with its particular coefficient. The 
estimation results can be found in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Estimation Results 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
ln GDP Dest. 0.42*** 0.33** 0.36** 0.40*** 
ln GDP Rus. 0.85*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 
Conflict -0.10**    
Sender  -0.14** -0.15**  
Benefiter   -0.15 0.18 
Time effects YES YES YES YES 
Country-pair effects YES YES YES YES 
Sector effects YES YES YES YES 
N 55069 55069 55069 55069 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The first analysis regards the overall Russian exports to the rest of the world and is found in 
column 1. The model contains the usual gravity model variables plus the variable conflict, 
which is a dummy variable that has the value 1 for the years when Russia have sanctions 
imposed on them as a consequence of the Ukraine conflict and 0 otherwise. First, the two 
variables controlling for size, ln GDP of the importer and exporter, both have positive and 
significant coefficients, which is expected for gravity model estimations. A negative 
coefficient is expected on the conflict variable, as this would imply that the estimation is in 
line with previous research, indicating that overall Russian exports have reduced since 
sanctions were imposed. This is also the result as the coefficient has the value –0.10 and is 
statistically significant on a 5% level, stressing the theory that Russia need to seek alternate 
export markets and cannot operate in the old markets to the same extent as they did before the 
Ukraine conflict. Resting on these results, a more sophisticated model is built to examine both 
if Russia’s exports have shifted at all and further also how it have shifted. First, column 2 is 
an estimation of to what degree the decreased Russian exports can be derived specifically 
from the countries that have imposed sanctions. The coefficient of interest in this estimation is 
the one for the sender-variable, which has a value of -0.14 and is statistically significant on a 
5% level. This suggests that Russia exports less to the countries that have imposed sanctions 
than to the rest of the world, which ultimately allows for further estimations to examine if 
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their exports have been diverted. The result is interesting since the sanctions do not explicitly 
apply to goods exported from Russia (with an exception for firearms and weapons) and yet 
there appears to be a negative export effect that is present.  
 
The final estimation is then carried in from foundation of these previous findings, examining 
to what degree Russia are instead exporting to countries similar to the sanctioning countries 
that they have decreased their exports to. Column 3 has thus included the variable Benefiter, 
for which a positive coefficient imply that Russia have indeed diverted their exports to 
countries similar to the sanctioning countries. The variable is created with the values from the 
previously discussed Export Similarity Index. Looking at the estimation results, the 
coefficient for benefiter is not significantly different from zero, implying that it is not possible 
to state that Russia have increased their exports to these countries. Instead the result suggests 
that despite the decreased exports to the rest of the world, Russia’s exports to the countries 
similar to the sanctioning countries have not decreased.  
 
Summarising the estimation results, the estimations suggest that there are three main effects 
on Russia’s exports where; (i) Russia’s overall exports to the rest of the world has decreased, 
(ii) exports to sanctioning countries have decreased more than the rest of the world and (iii) 
exports to countries similar to the sanctioning countries have not decreased. 
 
6.2. Discussion and Robustness of Results 
This section acts as a supplementary discussion with the intension of dissecting the main 
estimation results in order to find plausible flaws or problems that might occur. By 
performing robustness tests through various methods and angles, the findings in this paper 
will be discussed so that the estimation results are as transparent as possible. The robustness 
tests are carried out by estimating Equation (3) with other methods, including new variables 
and also by changing some variables. This is done to test if there might be any variations or 
definitions that is driving the main results to an extent that gives reason to question them. The 
robustness tests are found in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Robustness Tests 
Variable OLS GLS FE Oil excl. Sim. dummy Sim. + Crit. 
ln GDP Dest. 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.25 0.33** 0.35** 
ln GDP Rus. 0.12 0.12 0.51*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 
Sender -0.05 -0.05 -0.15* -0.24* -0.19* 
Benefiter 0.68** 0.68*** -0.17   
Sim. Dummy    -0.15  
Sim+ Criticism     -0.09 
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-pair effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Sector effects YES YES YES YES YES 
N 55070 55070 53158 55069 55069 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
As mentioned before, estimating the gravity model by OLS is not the optimal method, it is 
however useful when performing robustness tests as it can be a good validator to the main 
results. Therefor, as a first measure of the robustness, the model in Equation (3) will be 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), where the only alteration to Equation (3) is that 
the dependent variable is in log values. The coefficient for the benefiter variable stands out, as 
it is positive and significant on a 10% level, which can be interpreted as that exports have 
increased to the countries similar to the sanctioning countries. This result differs to the main 
estimation, where no effect was found on these countries, which gives some incentive to at 
least put a question mark on the original results. However, it does not contradict the main 
points of the original results where the export to the “similar countries” did not decrease. 
Again, the OLS estimation is not the optimal method for these estimations, which can be 
sensed the coefficient to ln GDP Rus. is not significantly different from zero. Another 
estimation of Equation (3) is also carried out, but with a fixed effects GLS method instead of 
the PPML method. The results are the same as the OLS estimation, which for natural reasons 
is not surprising, as the two are based on similar methods of estimations. 
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The following three estimations are all performed with the original PPML method, but with 
different alterations to the model. This is done in order to examine if the main results are 
driven by specific definitions of variables or certain products. As depicted in the descriptive 
statistics section, export of mineral products constituted a large part of Russia’s total exports. 
The estimation in the column Oil excl. is therefor carried out on all products except the 
mineral products, in this way the effects of all other products are presented. The coefficients 
are similar to the ones in the main estimations, except for the ln GDP dest. which is not 
significantly different from zero here. The result suggests that exports decreased to the 
sanctioning countries and exports to the “similar countries” did not decrease, much like in the 
main estimations where all products were included. The conclusion that can be drawn from 
this is that trade in oil does not drive the main results.  
 
The next test will use a transformed interpretation of the ESI in order to investigate if the 
results depend on how the ESI-measure is specified. Hence, in the column Sim. Dummy, the 
original variable benefiter is transformed into a dummy variable, where all countries that have 
an ESI above 0.2 are considered similar to the sanctioning countries. These countries therefor 
have the value 1 and all other countries that are “not similar” have the value 0. Examining the 
test, the coefficients all have like values and significance as the main estimation, implying 
that the result is not dependent on how similarity is defined. Finally, the constitution of the 
benefiter variable is narrowed down considerably. In the column Sim. + Criticism the original 
variable of possible benefiters of the sanctions contains countries that satisfy two dummies. 
Here, countries that have expressed criticism against the sanctions have the value 1 and as in 
the previous test, countries that are similar to the sanctioning countries have the value 1. 
These two are merged into the variable Sim. crit. which thus have the value 1 if countries are 
similar and have also expressed criticism against the sanctions. Intuitively, these countries 
could be happy to trade with Russia as that are opposing the sanctions and have the same 
trade characteristics as the imposing countries. The results are however in line with the main 
estimations, not suggesting increased Russian exports to these countries. 
 
The above tests have examined the robustness of the original results in this paper, finding 
both support for the main estimations as well as potential areas of improvements. Regarding 
the constitution of the particular variables, the tests did not find that the results where 
dependent of how variables where defined. Neither did the large fraction of mineral exports 
drive the result in another direction than suggested by the main estimations. What did have 
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some impact was the choice of estimation method, as both the OLS and GLS estimations 
indicated that export to the countries similar to the ones imposing sanctions did increase. 
However, despite the fact that these methods have been argued to have flaws and are not 
considered optimal for estimating the gravity model, their results should not be completely 
neglected. Instead of completely discrediting them, the results can be argued not to contradict 
the main estimations in the perception that they also suggest that the exports to the similar 
countries have not decreased. 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has examined if trade diversion can decrease a country’s negative effects of having 
sanctions imposed. It is again worth stressing the fact that the main objective of the paper is to 
examine how countries targeted with sanctions manage to divert trade in a general 
perspective, but the estimations are carried out on the specific case of the Russian sanctions. 
Two questions building on each other is raised in order to specify the intension and purpose of 
research. First, the question on how Russia and its exports were affected by the sanctions 
against them was examined. Secondly, the paper aimed to investigate how trade to third 
countries could decrease potential negative effects of the sanctions. This was examined 
through estimations on Russia’s exports to the rest of the world, where in the later 
estimations, countries were distinguished in line with their individual characteristics needed 
for the analysis. The analysis was carried out with a gravity model estimated with Poisson 
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood on a total sample of 55,070 observations. In addition to the 
main results from the estimations, several robustness tests were performed in order to assess if 
there were reason to question the results due to specification problems or other factors driving 
the results. 
 
The results of the estimations showed that Russia’s exports have decreased since the sanctions 
were imposed. Furthermore, the sanctions had a negative effect on the export to the countries 
imposing the sanctions, but exports to countries similar to Russia without sanctions imposed 
did not fall. The conclusion from these results can be threefold, where it could be argued that 
(i) overall exports to the rest of the world decrease when targeted with sanctions, (ii) exports 
to sanctioning countries have decreased more than the rest of the world and (iii) exports to 
countries similar to the sanctioning countries have not decreased. Thus, a country that is 
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targeted with sanctions need to increase exports to other markets to a high extent in order to 
minimise the negative effects from the sanctions. 
 
As a finishing remark, this paper has based the estimations on the relatively young, prevailing 
Russian sanctions and diverting trade could be a slow process. It could therefor be useful to 
carry out a similar report on the sanctions ex-post to ultimately examine the definitive effects 
on whether or not the effects of the sanctions could be decreased by successful trade diversion 
after the conflict is solved and the sanctions are lifted. 
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Appendix 
List of countries with sanctions imposed on Russia 
Members of European Union 
Australia 
Albania 
Iceland 
Canada 
Lichtenstein 
Norway 
New Zealand 
USA 
Ukraine 
Montenegro 
Switzerland 
Japan 
Equador 
 
List of countries that are against the sanctions on Russia 
Argentina 
Belarus 
Brazil 
Serbia 
China 
India 
Chile 
Ecuador 
South Africa 
